

Online version

**THEMATIC REVIEW OF
LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL TRANSGENDER
RELATED MURDERS**

**LGBT ADVISORY GROUP TO
THE METROPOLITAN
POLICE**



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The LGBT Advisory Group is a group of independent advisors to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). We are a voluntary group working for better policing for LGBT people in London. Our work is facilitated by the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate of the Metropolitan Police.

For more information on our work, please visit our website at <http://www.lgbtag.org.uk>.

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1 Executive summary

The purpose of our review is to extract lessons to be learnt and to identify best practice from selected investigations of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) into lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)-related murders.

We have chosen six investigations from 1990 to 2002 with a total number of 10 victims: Michael Boothe (1990), Robyn Browne (1997), Jaap Bornkamp (2000), Geoffrey Windsor (2002), David Ridehalgh (2002) and the victims of the serial murders of Colin Ireland (1993): Peter Walker, Christopher Dunn, Perry Bradley III, Andrew Collier and Emanuel Spiteri.

Our primary source is a review of these cases that we commissioned from the MPS. This was performed by a team led by DI Stephen Dingvean of the Homicide Command of the Specialist Crime Directorate, focussing on four LGBT-related themes that we selected:

- Gender identity, sexual orientation and lifestyle of the victim
- Liaison with victim family and support networks
- Community liaison
- Media relations.

We have also identified several other common issues among these cases: public sex environments, reporting, information systems, independent advice and language.

The investigations in the early 1990s were hampered by a lack of understanding and sensitivity towards LGBT people and also by deep mistrust of the police within the LGBT community due to historical policing practice. Later investigations, on the other hand, were more effective in engaging with the community through the use of LGBT Liaison Officers and independent advisors.

The following summarises our key recommendations:

- Proactive prevention strategies are needed to avoid escalation of violent crimes. This requires pan-London coordination of intelligence and risk assessments.
- Increased levels of crimes should be communicated to vulnerable groups which may be hard to reach, *e.g.* sex workers and users of public sex environments.
- Much work is needed to encourage the reporting of homophobic and transphobic crimes. Channels for non-police and third-party reporting should be developed.
- The role of LGBT Liaison Officers is key to community liaison. This should be developed further through the sharing of best practice.
- Local independent advice is needed in addition to pan-London strategic advice. This requires engagement with local LGBT networks on policing issues.
- MPS and national information systems need searchable indices on LGBT-related information for effective analysis of intelligence.
- Awareness training is needed for officers dealing with LGBT-related crimes.
- The case review process for murder investigations must include a review of issues related to community liaison.

2 Introduction

2.1 What is the purpose of this Murder Review?

The purpose of our review is to extract lessons to be learnt and to identify best practice from selected investigations of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) of LGBT-related murders from 1990 to 2002. We have chosen six investigations with a total number of 10 victims.

Several of the murders being reviewed here received much attention at the time from the LGBT and mainstream media. They continue to be a sensitive subject for many LGBT people. Although some of these cases remain unsolved, it is not our purpose to re-investigate these murders. We do not have the expertise to do so. The police do have a systematic case review process (see Appendix A).

We focus on the LGBT-specific issues that arise from the circumstance of these murders: Was the police investigation able to address the LGBT issues effectively and adequately? Did they respond to the needs of the family and support network of the victims? Did they have an effective strategy for community liaison in terms of gathering intelligence and community reassurance?

2.2 Brief history

This project was initiated by the LGBT Advisory Group in 2002 with the agreement of the head of the Diversity Directorate at the time, Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve. We consulted members of the Advisory Group and others on our selection of murder cases to review. We also explored various methodologies. Our original proposal was to review the case files of the murders and to interview the senior investigating officers of the investigation teams. After a lengthy attempt to use this as a starting point for discussions with the police, we failed to reach agreement with the police on this form of review.

In the end, we made direct contact with the Homicide Command of the Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD), and agreed on an indirect review where we use as our primary source a review report commissioned from a team of experienced SCD officers, led by DI Stephen Dingvean. The police report was completed in 2005. Our work on this independent report started in earnest in late 2005, using both information from the police report and material already in the public domain.

2.3 Methodology

Six investigations into 10 murders were selected as case studies for our review:

- Murder of Michael Boothe (1990, unsolved)
- Murders committed by the serial murderer Colin Ireland: Peter Walker, Christopher Dunn, Perry Bradley III, Andrew Collier and Emanuel Spiteri (1993, solved).
- Murder of Robyn Browne (1997, unsolved)
- Murder of Jaap Bornkamp (2000, unsolved)

- Murder of Geoffrey Windsor (2002, unsolved)
- Murder of David Ridehalgh (2002, solved)

The years from 1990 to 2002 cover a period of significant change in the relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the LGBT community. If we borrow the terminology of the Macpherson Report (Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 1998-99), historical policing practice amounted to ‘institutional’ homophobia and transphobia. In recent years, however, the police have made much progress in improving community relations through attempts to engage the community and to reflect diversity in recruitment.

In order to make a historical comparison, three cases were chosen from the 1990s and three from 2000 onwards. The last three investigations were carried out after the implementation of the recommendations of the Macpherson Report. In particular, the later investigations involved independent advisors from the LGBT community from the outset.

We were also keen to include some cases which had received much media attention and therefore had a significant impact on community confidence. Since several of the murders are unsolved, these cases remain relevant to the LGBT community today.

The vast majority of LGBT-related murders involve the murders of gay men. We have nevertheless attempted to include victims from diverse backgrounds. One of our selected cases is the murder of Robyn Browne, a transgender woman. Unfortunately, despite strenuous efforts, we could not identify any cases with lesbian victims from the MPS database. We also did not identify any cases involving domestic violence.

We recognise that there are many issues specific to crimes with lesbian victims and crimes involving domestic violence, and much work needs to be done. Nevertheless, we believe that many of the lessons that we have identified in this study apply to all LGBT-related crimes.

Since we did not have access to the original case files, we have relied on a police review as our key source of information from which we have produced this report. A team led by DI Stephen Dingvean produced a review in 2005 from the case files. Their report provided a summary of the circumstances of the murders and the subsequent police investigations. We asked them to review the investigations of these cases based on the following four themes:

- **Gender identity, sexual orientation and lifestyle of the victim:** how did these factors impact upon the police investigation?
- **Sensitivity to family and support networks:** did the police investigation display sensitivity and understanding towards the victim’s family and support networks?
- **Community liaison:** did the police have effective community liaison?
- **Media relations:** did the police have an effective media strategy, especially in relation to the LGBT media?

In addition to the MPS report, we have also used contemporary newspaper and magazine articles as a source of information, in particular, on the theme of community and media relations.

In Section 3, we present the circumstances of the murders with some autobiographical information on the victims. In Sections 4 to 7, we review the police investigations along the four themes outlined above. We make conclusions about the effectiveness of the police investigations and recommendations for lessons to be learnt.

In Section 8, we discuss a particular case outside the remit of the Dingvean report. In this case, there was no community liaison during the original investigation. During the time of our review, this case was designated for review in the regular case review process. This raised concerns about the murder review procedures of the MPS.

In Sections 9 to 13, we gather together several important policy and practice issues that we wish to highlight. These are issues common to several or all of the cases reviewed. They include alternative channels of crime reporting, effectiveness of police information systems, the policing of public sex environments (*e.g.* cruising grounds), the management of critical incidents, and issues of language and terminology.

3 The people and the circumstances of their murders

3.1 Michael Boothe (1942-1990)

Michael Boothe was an actor with a career spanning three decades, which included roles on the West End stage. Michael had no regular partner and lived alone in west London. He was a gay man and socialised on the gay scene.

After a Saturday night out in Earls Court on 28 April 1990, Michael Boothe was violently attacked by a gang of six or seven men near the public toilets close to his home in Elthorne Park. He was found at 1am on Sunday 29 April by two pedestrians. He had several fractured ribs and one foot was nearly severed from his leg. His condition worsened over the next few hours. He died from massive internal bleeding due to the multiple injuries he had suffered.

Michael Boothe had visited the area around the toilets at Elthorne Park before. It was known as a place where men could meet other men for casual sex. There had been previous attacks on the men who used these toilets for this purpose. The *Gay Times* also reported that 'gay-bashing' was common in the area and that victims were afraid to go to the police. Aware of this obstacle for witnesses to come forward, the murder investigation team emphasised in their witness appeal that they would not judge the behaviour of any witnesses who came forward.

A gang of local youths were arrested and questioned in relation to Michael Boothe's murder. They had been causing trouble in the neighbourhood on the same night and some of them were known to have made homophobic remarks. However, the police were unable to charge them with the crime due to a lack of evidence linking them to the murder.

The case was reviewed in 2002, and was the subject of a *Crimewatch* BBC television programme. It was subsequently closed due to the lack of new evidence.

3.2 Ireland murders

3.2.1 Peter Walker (1948-1993)

Peter Walker was a 45-year-old theatre director living in Battersea. His family knew that he was gay and they did not appear to have any issues with it. For 19 years, he was in a long-term relationship. That came to an end when his partner died in 1992. He socialised on the gay scene and was a regular customer of the Coleherne pub, which was a popular meeting place for gay men from all over London during the 80s and 90s.

At the start of 1993, Peter was busy with rehearsals for a forthcoming production in the West End. He had a short break from rehearsals over the first weekend of March. On Monday 8 March, he went out for a drink at the Coleherne. There, he met a man, Colin Ireland, whom he invited home for sex. Peter's friends knew that he had an interest in sado-masochism (S&M). It was not clear how much of the S&M activity that took place that night was consensual. However, Peter Walker was eventually beaten and died of suffocation at the hands of Ireland.

Ireland made a call to The Samaritans the following Wednesday, confessing to the

murder and giving Peter Walker's name and address. In fact, his body had already been found by a colleague, who was concerned that he had not restarted rehearsals on Tuesday as originally planned. Peter Walker was the first of five men murdered by Ireland.

3.2.2 Christopher Dunn (1954-1993)

Christopher Dunn was a librarian living in Wealdstone, Middlesex. His family was aware that Christopher was gay, although not all the family were comfortable with his sexuality. The family also knew Christopher's partner of 11 years.

In addition to having a long-term partner, Christopher also met other men on a casual or regular basis. He would meet them through contact ads or gay venues such as the Coleherne pub.

His partner had arranged to meet up with Christopher on Sunday 30 May 1993 at his home. He found Christopher dead, naked in bed. His body was badly bruised. It was again not clear how much of the physical abuse was part of consensual sex. A post mortem showed that he died of 'traumatic asphyxia' (strangulation). Initially, the police treated his death as unexplained and did not immediately conclude that it was a murder. In fact, Christopher Dunn was Ireland's second victim.

3.2.3 Perry Bradley III (1958-1993)

Perry Bradley III was the son of a US congressman. In 1993, he was in charge of the European operation of a Texas-based company, having arrived in London in 1990 to establish a UK office. He led a compartmentalised life, keeping his sexuality from his family, friends and colleagues.

Perry was a regular customer at the Coleherne pub. It appears that he met Colin Ireland on the evening of Friday 4 June 1993.

Perry's body was found at his flat in Kensington on Monday by a business associate and friend who was concerned that he had missed an important business meeting. He died of strangulation after having been tortured. Because colleagues and family assumed he was heterosexual, it was some time before the police identified his murder as LGBT-related.

3.2.4 Andrew Collier (1960-1993)

Andrew Collier was a housing warden for a block of flats for the elderly in Hackney. He was an openly gay man in his day-to-day life. Although his mother and brother knew that he was gay, his father did not. He had a partner of two years. On Monday 7 June 1993, Andrew went drinking in Soho and then moved on to the Coleherne pub in Earls Court at 10pm. By midnight, Andrew had met Colin Ireland and invited him back to his flat. He was beaten and strangled. His murder took place only three days after the death of Perry Bradley.

3.2.5 Emanuel Spiteri (1951-1993)

Emanuel Spiteri worked in South Kensington and was also a regular customer at the Coleherne. He had had a partner who died in 1985. A deeply religious man, Emanuel chose to keep his sexuality from his family in Malta. Only a cousin knew that he was gay.

Emanuel was interested in the leather scene. In fact, people recognised him from a

photograph that was used in the police appeal in which he was dressed in leather with a leather cap. On June 12 1993, he went to the Coleherne and met Ireland there. The police later found several witnesses who saw them on their way to Emanuel's home in Catford. He was the last of Ireland's known victims. He was also strangled by Ireland. On this occasion, Ireland also attempted to set fire to the flat.

3.3 Robyn Browne (1971-1997)

Robyn Browne was a pre-operative transsexual woman. (She was also known as James, Jenna or Errol.) She was a sex worker using her home in Marylebone as a base for her clients. She shared her flat with a close friend, Natasha Brentwood. They were well known within the transgender community in London. Her parents could not accept her way of life. The only family member to keep in touch with Robyn was her sister.

Robyn appeared to be preparing to see a client in the early evening of 28 February 1997. Two boys in the same building as Robyn let a man in through the front door and he went upstairs towards Robyn's flat. One of the boys described him as white with blond hair, clean-shaven and dressed in black. His mother said that she heard people struggling and stamping in Robyn's flat. (The police could not obtain parental permission to interview the other boy.) When Robyn's flatmate returned from dinner at 8pm, she found Robyn's body with multiple stab wounds to the chest and neck.

The police investigation concentrated on Robyn's associates and acquaintances. Several suspects were identified but later eliminated from the investigation, either due to an alibi or due to the absence of any forensic evidence linking them to the scene of the crime. DNA and fingerprint samples were taken from the scene. A review in 1999 recommended sending these samples to be checked against overseas databases because one of Robyn's last clients was thought to be from overseas. However, no new evidence has surfaced, and Robyn's murder remains unsolved.

3.4 Jaap Bornkamp (1945-2000)

Dutch-born Jaap Bornkamp had worked as a floral designer for a top florist company before setting up his own business in 1990. He had many high-profile private and corporate clients. Jaap shared a house with his partner of 20 years.

At 7am on Sunday 4 June 2000, he was leaving the 309 all-night gay sauna in New Cross with a friend. As they were walking along the road, two men came towards them. As far as we know, no conversation or incident took place. One of the men suddenly stabbed Jaap in the chest with a knife and then walked on. Jaap Bornkamp died of his stab wound three hours later in Lewisham hospital.

The police treated this unprovoked attack as homophobic from the outset. The identification of the murderer was hindered by poor CCTV footage, inconclusive DNA evidence and the subsequent death of the only witness, Jaap's companion on the day. This resulted in suspects being released. The case has received media attention as well as two appearances on *Crimewatch*. In 2002, his former partner doubled the police reward to £20,000 in a renewed appeal for information.

3.5 Geoffrey Windsor (1945-2002)

Geoffrey Windsor was a gay man who lived a secluded life. His work colleagues were

unaware that he was gay. His next of kin, his sister, was unsure if he was gay as he had had relationships with women before. He had no long-term partner.

Geoffrey lived in Norwood in south London. He was known to visit a nearby park, Beaulieu Heights, a popular cruising area where men could meet other men for sex. There had been reports of violent homophobic crimes in the area and also in another cruising ground nearby (located in another borough). In the early hours of 26 June 2002, he was found unconscious in Beaulieu Heights. He had been so severely beaten that there was a footprint on his face. He died in hospital later that day.

The investigation has received media attention including a BBC *Crimewatch* appeal. Geoffrey's family was initially wary of the disclosure of his sexuality, but have since been persuaded by the police that it was an appropriate course of action. They also contributed to the reward that the police offered for information. Geoffrey's murder remains unsolved.

3.6 David Ridehalgh (1967-2002)

David Ridehalgh had travelled the world, working as a barman and a waiter, before circumstances forced him to survive on benefit and begging. He drank regularly at a churchyard in Limehouse in east London, near the Salvation Army hostel that he was staying in. On the night of 30 January 2002 he was drinking at the churchyard with a group of people. It is not known exactly why one of the group, Fergus Tracey, attacked David with a brick. He was also severely kicked. He died of a cardiac arrest while being taken to hospital.

David's body was discovered with his trousers and underwear pulled to his knees. There was also significant bruising to his genitals. The police initially treated the crime as potentially homophobic. In the end, a homophobic element could not be established since witnesses said that the clothing was pulled out of position when Tracey tried to move the body.

Tracey later claimed that David had made an unsolicited and unwanted pass at him. The police made enquiries about David's sexual orientation. Different witnesses expressed different opinions about his sexual orientation. Nevertheless, it was clear that David did not self-identify as a gay man.

Tracey was convicted of the murder of David Ridehalgh. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

4 Theme: Gender identity, sexual orientation and lifestyle of the victim

How did the police connect the sexual orientation/gender identity of the victim to the crime? How did the sexual orientation/gender identity impact on the choice of lines of enquiry the police considered or rejected? How were these choices followed up?

There were several investigations where we have deep reservations about the way in which the identity of the victim informed investigative decisions at the time. We also found evidence of inappropriate attitudes to the circumstances of some murders, as evidenced by the language of the police review conducted on our behalf.

4.1 Michael Boothe (1990)

4.1.1 Background: rise of homophobic crimes and lack of police response

Michael was the third gay man murdered in west London in a seven-month period. (There had been two previous murders: Christoph Schilach and William Dalziel). It is important to understand the public attitudes and policing practices at the time of Michael Boothe's murder.

At this time (April 1990), there was an atmosphere of heightened homophobia. This was against the background of fiercely fought local elections. The Conservative Party was trying to wrest control of the Ealing Council from Labour. They fought a viciously homophobic campaign, including a pledge to disband the Council's lesbian and gay unit. Peter Knight of the Ealing Gay Association was quoted after the murder as saying that 'the climate of hate against lesbians and gays has been slowly building.' (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*, 4 May 1990).

During this period of heightened homophobia, there was a spate of homophobic attacks in the area, including the area around Elthorne Park. We do not know the precise figures because the Metropolitan Police did not monitor homophobic crime in 1990. However, the police did know that there had been attacks in the area but no one had been charged.

This lack of police response could have sent a message to the perpetrators that their actions would go unchallenged. This could have led to an escalation in the number and the violence of these incidents.

The lack of response also reinforced a common perception that violent crimes at cruising grounds do not receive attention from the police, implying that the victims were partly to blame. Indeed, a common reaction to crimes committed near cruising grounds is to emphasise the risk that the victims were taking. In fact, the MPS Murder Review team itself expressed such a sentiment about Boothe's murder:

'His lifestyle involved him frequenting public toilets for the purpose of public sex environment acts; this included the toilets located at Elthorne Park. These toilets were also known as a venue where attacks on members of the gay community were taking place. These two factors were destined to bring Boothe into contact with his murderers and the subsequent events that surrounded his death.'

These remarks seem to suggest that Michael Boothe's behaviour meant that his death was inevitable. We would argue that the murder was not 'destined' to take place, especially if the local police had investigated seriously the previous attacks in the area and if they had warned the users of the cruising ground of the dangers. We will return to discuss the policing of cruising grounds in Section 11, after we have reviewed another similar case, the murder of Geoffrey Windsor in 2002.

4.1.2 Background: mistrust and under-reporting of crimes

Mistrust of the police was common in the LGBT community until the 1990s. It stemmed from the historical attitudes towards gay people (before 1967, gay men were considered criminals under the law) and towards the use of public sex environments. More specifically in Ealing in the late 1980s, the police adopted a hard-line approach to policing local toilets, including Elthorne Park. In 1989, they even staged a mounted police patrol to 'control indecency' (*Gay Times*, April 1999). In 1990, *Capital Gay* pointed out that 105 gay men were arrested in Ealing on sexual offences in 1989, up 140% on the previous year.

It is therefore not surprising that there was significant under-reporting of homophobic crimes to the police, especially of incidents near cruising grounds such as Elthorne Park. Councillor John Gallagher, then Deputy Chairman of Ealing's Lesbian and Gay Consultative Group, said, "I've had cases reported to me of people too afraid to go to the police. They range from verbal abuse to extremes of physical violence." (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*, 4 May 1990).

4.1.3 The investigation: loss of documentation/poor records

It would have been useful to consider the impact of the factors discussed above on the conduct of the investigation. Unfortunately, the report provided for us by the MPS Murder Review team states that 'due to the misplacement of documentation, including the Policy File/Decision Log it has not been possible to comment on how Boothe's sexual orientation impacted on police lines of enquiry.'

There has been no explanation forthcoming for the missing logs. Despite the high profile nature of this case over many years, we do not know when these key documents went missing. One explanation is that decisions were never systematically recorded. This is in distinct contrast to the practice today, which is to maintain contemporaneous records of all decisions, detailing the rationale behind them.

In these circumstances, we cannot conclude whether or not the decision-making process during the investigation was affected by homophobic prejudice in relation to Michael Boothe's sexual orientation or lifestyle.

4.1.4 The investigation: police attitudes

Although we do not have the police records, we can find some indication of the attitudes of the police to this investigation from press coverage of the time.

During the investigation, the police understood that there were unreported attacks in the area and appealed for witnesses. Detective Inspector Woodman stated that the police were 'not here to judge their way of living but to solve a murder' (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*, 4 May 1990). However, this neutral non-judgmental stance was not consistently maintained. After calls for police liaison officers, awareness training and

resources to combat anti-gay violence, Chief Superintendent Shoemake responded by saying:

“A person born with any sort of colour doesn’t have a choice in the matter. I would suggest that sexual preferences, however, are a matter of individual choice.”

He further claimed that although some homosexuals behaved responsibly:

“...the problem comes with the other type of homosexual who often leads a double lifestyle, often using false identities, actually frequenting pubs, clubs and public toilets, has casual pick ups for the purposes of sex and of course doesn’t wish to be exposed.” (*Pink Paper*, 21 July 1990).

This attitude was a historical remnant of the police treatment of gay men as criminals. Not only was this incorrect stereotyping, it was also counter-productive to the witness appeals.

4.2 The Ireland murders (1993)

4.2.1 Linkage of the crimes: missed opportunities

The investigation of the serial murders by Colin Ireland was hampered by a lack of knowledge of the gay scene in London and the special culture of S&M/bondage. In particular, valuable time was lost before the police managed to recognise two common threads to the crimes. These links were established only after the death of the fourth victim, Andrew Collier. (A chronology provided at the end of this section.)

First of all, Ireland tied his victims as part of restraint-related role-playing during foreplay, and sought men who were already interested in this or could be introduced to it. The investigators had great difficulty interpreting the circumstances in which they found the victims. The second common thread was that Ireland chose all his victims from the same pub, the Coleherne. In the 1980s and 90s, the Coleherne was known in the LGBT community as a meeting place for men who shared an interest in S&M and bondage. However, since the victims were killed in their own homes in different parts of London, this link was not immediately apparent to the police.

As a result of these difficulties, the suspicious deaths of the first two victims, Peter Walker (8 March) and Christopher Dunn (28 May), were not linked. In fact, the police did not designate the death of the first victim, Peter Walker, as a homophobic murder until Ireland himself told them. The death of the second victim, Christopher Dunn, was initially treated as unexplained, following the pathologist’s opinion that death could have occurred as an accident during consensual S&M activity.

The third victim, Perry Bradley, also went to the Coleherne. However, his sexuality was not known to family and colleagues, and so his murder was not initially classified as homophobic. Again, the homophobic link was established only when Ireland called the Kensington police station after Perry’s murder.

The murder of the fourth victim, Andrew Collier, was recognised as gay-related from the outset. It was through contact with Galop (see next section) and calls from Ireland himself that Collier’s murder was linked with the death of the first victim, Peter Walker. The link occurred on the second day of the Collier investigation (10 June). This meant that, when investigating the suspicious death of Perry Bradley III (4 June), the

investigators did not approach the Coleherne to find out if Bradley had been there on the night he died until after both the deaths of Andrew Collier (8 June) and Emanuel Spiteri (12 June).

4.2.2 Linkage of the crimes: use of community intelligence

As the police found out more and more about the personal lives of the victims of these serial killings, they understood that they needed community advice. However, it was also clear that the police lacked the knowledge to deal with the information they had gathered. Within 48 hours of Peter Walker's death, the police contacted a community organisation, Galop, which monitors LGBT policing issues. This is because they believed that the death occurred whilst Walker was having sex. At this stage, they had not yet designated this first death as homophobic.

The contact with Galop turned out to be a key development in the investigation. After the death of Andrew Collier, the Collier investigation team contacted Galop again. On 10 June, Galop pointed out that there could be a linkage between the deaths of Walker and Collier (first and fourth victims) from the similarity in the S&M circumstances of their death. (This was confirmed by calls from Colin Ireland himself that connected the Walker and Collier cases.)

4.2.3 Representation of LGBT life

Given the climate of fear about HIV/AIDS at the time, the HIV status of the victims was highlighted and sensationalised in the press (see Appendix D). It was not clear whether the public disclosure of this information was useful. However, this information could be easily interpreted as a marker for promiscuity, adding to the stereotyping of the victims.

Recommendation 1. We recommend that clear protocols must be developed for the public disclosure of HIV status, assessing the relevance of such disclosure to the investigation.

4.2.4 Summary

Police at the time failed to deal adequately with LGBT life and culture. The initial investigations of the first murders seemed to us to be more focussed on determining promiscuity and risk taking, and seemed predisposed to interpreting circumstances as sex acts 'gone wrong'. We would argue that given the rarity of such suspicious circumstances the police should have been in a position to link the first two murders, and to have done much more to warn the community at all times after that - particularly following the murder of Andrew Collier. This represents a serious failure of policing.

Chronology (March – August 1993)

- 8 Mar **Peter Walker killed**
- 10 Mar Walker's body discovered by colleague. Murder enquiry starts
- 10 Mar Ireland calls Samaritans. Also calls The Sun claiming to have killed a homosexual.
- 11 Mar House of Lords ruling on Spanner case [criminal status of S&M activity]
- 12 Mar Walker team contacts Galop
- 28 May **Christopher Dunn killed**
- 30 May Dunn's body discovered
- 4 Jun **Perry Bradley killed**
- 7 Jun Bradley's body discovered. Not treated as homophobic, investigators not aware of Bradley's sexuality
- 8 Jun **Andrew Collier killed**
- 9 Jun Collier team contacts Galop
- 10 Jun Galop and police link Walker and Collier murders
- 12 Jun Ireland calls Kensington police station claiming responsibility for Bradley and three others. Also calls Battersea police station.
- Emanuel Spiteri killed**
- 14 Jun Press statement linking Walker and Collier
- 15 Jun Ireland calls Arbour Sq police about Spiteri's body and links all 5 murders
Spiteri's body discovered by landlady
Treated as homophobic murder, linked by modus operandi
Urgent press release and midnight conference to warn of serial killer. Galop present, but no LGBT media
- 16 Jun Key witness who followed Ireland and Spiteri calls Galop
- 18 Jun Witness interviewed by police providing vital evidence leading to retrieval of CCTV images of Ireland at Charing Cross
- 19 Jun Police appeal leaflets at Pride
- 21 Jun Press Conference, first time with LGBT media
- 23 Jun Description of Ireland released
- 26 Jun Police issues e-fit of Ireland with Spiteri at Charing Cross
- 2 Jul Police appeal with new picture.
- 3 Jul 40 calls received from Coleherne customers who have met Ireland
- 5 Jul Exclusive conference with LGBT media on Charing Cross CCTV images
- 7 Jul Officer from the Lesbian and Gay Police Association joins investigation
- 19 Jul Ireland meets his solicitor
- 20 Jul Ireland meets police with solicitor
- 21 Jul Ireland charged with Collier's murder (forensic: fingerprint)
- 23 Jul Also charged with Spiteri's murder
- 19 Aug Ireland confesses to all 5 murders while on remand

(Source: MPS Review, *Gay Times* Feb 94)

4.3 Robyn Browne (1997)

4.3.1 Victim lifestyle: sex worker

The murder of a transgender sex worker in the West End does not attract much public attention. This makes it difficult for the police to investigate the crime. This is recognised by the MPS Murder Review:

‘the nature of the enquiries and lifestyle of the victim has meant that not unnaturally witnesses and clients have been somewhat reluctant to come forward. The case also has not attracted the sympathy of the general public and therefore information coming into the investigation team has been limited.’

4.3.2 Representation of LGBT life: gender identity

Transgender people adopt new names as part of the transition to the gender with which they identify. There was a lot of confusion regarding the name of the victim. The MPS Review gave four names for Robyn Browne (Robyn, James, Jenna and Errol). James Browne, her birth name, was used in the initial media coverage.

Given the importance of sensitive handling, it is very unfortunate that the first media stories confused the general public and misidentified the victim to potential witnesses. This could have undermined confidence in the police’s ability to handle sensitively the lifestyle of the victim and of her friends, colleagues or clients. Nonetheless, their subsequent efforts to reach out through community press and venues are to be welcomed.

This highlights the importance of accurate descriptions of transgender people.

Recommendation 2. In cases involving transgender people, advice should be sought from transgender community groups. Legal advice should also be taken regarding disclosure of transgender status. Training should be provided, in particular regarding recent legal reforms (Gender Recognition Act 2004).

A clear policy on transgender issues has since been developed by the LGBT Advisory Group, working in conjunction with the MPS. Routes for independent advice from sex workers have been established that made an important contribution to the investigation of a series of murders in North London outside the remit of this report.

4.4 Jaap Bornkamp (2000)

4.4.1 Representation of LGBT life

The murder investigation has benefited from the independent advisory structures and practice development since the creation of the LGBT Advisory Group.

Nonetheless, there are still some inconsistencies in the representation of Jaap Bornkamp’s family life. At one stage, he was described as a single man; later, it was mentioned that he had a long-term partner, albeit in a relatively open relationship. See Recommendation 19.

The MPS review also describes how Bornkamp was ‘overtly gay’ in dress and mannerisms. Again this indicates an inability to differentiate diversity within gay life and highlights the need for training around LGBT cultural diversity, including vocabulary.

Recommendation 3. Diversity training to the police needs to address cultural diversity among LGBT people.

4.5 Geoffrey Windsor (2002)

4.5.1 Cross-borough coordination

In this case, there are concerns about the nature of the police response to homophobic attacks prior to the murder. Beaulieu Heights is situated close to the junction of five police boroughs (Croydon, Bromley, Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham). There had been reports of homophobic attacks in nearby cruising grounds. We could not find any evidence of coordination among the investigations into these homophobic incidents. It is also not clear whether there was systematic sharing of intelligence on homophobic and transphobic crimes among the boroughs concerned. In addition, in the months prior to the murder there was insufficient communication of the level of risk associated with the cruising ground to the very wide range of people using it.

Recommendation 4. We recommend that the MPS should have a coordinated pan-London mechanism to share and analyse intelligence proactively to identify clustering of homophobic and transphobic crimes. Perpetrators of these crimes can move from one area to another. It is therefore important that any intelligence model is not restricted by geographical boundaries.

The quality of MPS information systems necessary for such analysis is discussed in Section 10. See also Section 11 on policing public sex environments.

4.5.2 Representation of LGBT life

The team investigating Windsor's murder invited LGBT advice from the outset. We find that they did appreciate the variety of ways such individuals would choose to define themselves. These would include gay, bisexual, straight and men who have sex with men, as well as sex workers.

4.6 David Ridehalgh (2002)

4.6.1 Homophobic motivation

A key question for the investigation of Ridehalgh's murder was whether the motive was homophobic. The police demonstrated great care and understanding in dealing with this question and we are satisfied that there was no evidence that the attack was homophobic.

In contrast with other cases in this review, the police practice was exemplary in dealing with the sexuality and lifestyle of the victim. They pursued with vigour the murder of a homeless man whose assailant claimed as defence that he had been the target of an unsolicited sexual advance. As a result, Fergus Tracey was found guilty and received a life sentence for the murder of David Ridehalgh.

It should be pointed that we do not regard as a mistake the initial flagging of the crime as homophobic at the outset of the investigation. There is a specific code for this on the electronic Crime Report Information System (CRIS). The flagging is appropriate if the victim, witnesses, the police officer attending the scene or even the wider community perceives a homophobic element to the crime.

5 Theme: Sensitivity to family and support networks

Some aspects of the family life of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people present particular challenges to agencies like the police, who are seeking to support the families of victims of crime. Many people have families of choice consisting of circles of friends offering nurturing and support alongside or even in lieu of that offered by blood relatives. In this section, we examine how sensitively the MPS support the extended family of the murder victims.

How did the police liaise with the victim's partner, next of kin, family and wider support network? What were the challenges relating to sexuality and/or gender identity? How did the police deal with them? How did the police deal with any conflict between the family and the victim's partner or support network? How did this impact on the effectiveness of the investigation?

5.1 Family Liaison Officer (FLO)

Members of **Christopher Dunn's** family had not come to terms with his sexuality; they were afforded a liaison officer. No separate liaison officer was assigned to his partner of over ten years.

Similarly the team also failed to appoint a liaison officer to **Andrew Collier's** partner of 18 months. Some of Andrew's close family were unaware of his sexuality. They were appointed a liaison officer whilst his partner was only informally kept up to date.

Recommendation 5. A separate family log should be maintained and a separate FLO should be assigned to a victim's 'family by choice' which may include a partner and close friends.

This is an extension of a recommendation by the MPS Review Team (MPS2 in Appendix C).

On the other hand, the **Jaap Bornkamp** case in 2000 was a model of good family liaison practice, resulting from the newly formed pathways for independent community advice. One FLO was appointed for his partner and overseas relatives as a result of their good relationship.

Robyn Browne had no partner at the time of her murder. An FLO was appointed for her relatives who could not reconcile themselves to Robyn's identity. A request by a friend to see her body was received. The same FLO responded to the request, but no formal liaison was established. There seems to have been no systematic effort to consider how best to support or liaise with Robyn's family by choice. As individuals, many of them would have had issues of trust and confidence with the police, especially after the mishandling of the initial publicity. As a result, an opportunity to build up trust and establish lines of communications was lost.

Taking the learning from these cases together, we recommend that:

Recommendation 6. Clear guidance should be given to FLOs and to investigators where the victim's sexuality/gender identity is not known to the blood family. In particular, three scenarios should receive close attention:

- where his/her sexuality or gender identity is known to people close to the victim or his/her social network but not shared with blood family;
- where the victim's sexuality/gender identity, though relevant, is not clearly known to anyone in his/her close circle;
- where the victim's known name differs between different family/social networks.

6 Theme: Community liaison

In this section, we discuss how the police dealt with the LGBT community in relation to these murder investigations. The interaction with the community has more than one purpose. From the investigative perspective, the police need to talk to the community to gather intelligence. In the high-profile incidents which have significant impact on community life, the community would need accurate factual information from the investigation team, as well as reassurance from police that measures are taken to ensure community safety.

6.1 Community confidence

6.1.1 Confidence in the police

In the earliest case in our review, the murder of **Michael Boothe**, it was clear that the police did not have effective channels of communication with the local community.

In particular, the police appealed for witnesses for a set of homophobic incidents involving a known gang of youths on the same night of the murder. However, potential witnesses and informants could have been the same men who had been targeted for arrests in previous clear-up operations at the public toilets. We believe that this contributed to the reluctance of witnesses to come forward.

This did not make it easy for the investigating team. This was in spite of the fact that the senior investigating officer appealed for witnesses with the reassurance that the murder investigation team was not interested in making judgments on the use of the public toilet for cruising and cottaging (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*) and that the police would treat any information as confidential.

Trust in the police was further damaged by the response of Chief Supt Shoemake's public remarks (see 4.1.4) (*Pink Paper*, 21 July 1990).

This highlights the importance of the police in gaining community confidence. The building of trust and confidence cannot be achieved overnight after a violent crime has occurred.

There was also a serious lack of community confidence in the police at the time of the **Ireland murders** due to policing practice of the time. For instance, in January 1991, customers of the Coleherne bar made a formal complaint to Kensington and Chelsea Police about police behaviour following a wake at the bar. The Coleherne pub was where Ireland met all his victims and was a key source of potential witnesses for that investigation.

Recommendation 7. The local police must have a proactive policy of continuing engagement with the community in order to build trust and confidence in the police.

6.1.2 Witness confidentiality

There are sensitive circumstances where witnesses are often reluctant to come forward for fear of being prosecuted. The **Ireland murders** coincided with the House of Lords ruling on the Spanner case which confirmed that consensual S&M activity could be prosecuted under the law. The Coleherne pub, where Ireland met all his victims, was a

popular meeting place for gay men interested in S&M. It is therefore no surprise that the investigators found it difficult to engage the community in their appeals.

On 21 June 1993, DCI Ken John invited the LGBT press to a briefing at New Scotland Yard. With reference to Operation Spanner, he was asked for assurances of an amnesty on any gay men coming forward with information. DCI John said any questioning “would not go beyond the boundaries of this operation” and he would “not interrogate them about any other information”. However, Bobby Pickering of SM Gays (a group promoting safe S&M activity) was unhappy and said he would have preferred a categorical statement that gay men who came forward would not be charged (*Pink Paper*, 25 June 1993).

For crimes at public sex environments, many potential witnesses may need to be reassured of confidentiality and anonymity before considering offering information to the police. As discussed above (Section 4.1.4), this was definitely the case for the investigation into **Michael Boothe**’s death. The lack of witnesses remains a major stumbling block to finding the murderers. Similar challenges arose for the investigation of **Geoffrey Windsor**’s murder at Beaulieu Heights.

6.2 LGBT Liaison Officers

In the **Ireland investigation**, a police officer who was known to be gay was deployed in the role of community liaison. The officer was a member of the Lesbian and Gay Police Association. This was an innovation for that time and was a result of mounting pressure from the LGBT community for the police to engage more fully with LGBT people. We believe that the publicity resulting from this contributed to a positive response to the police appeal for witnesses.

The role of the LGBT Liaison Officer has since been developed. It has become an important element of any policy of community engagement. This is a role that is developing rapidly in the MPS area. The use of this role varies widely across the London boroughs: while a handful of LGBT Liaison Officers perform their role full-time, some officers have as little as one day a month dedicated to the role.

Recommendation 8. We recommend that there should be at least one LGBT Liaison Officer working effectively in each of the Metropolitan police boroughs. LGBT Liaison Officers should be supported and appropriately resourced. Training should include opportunities for liaison officers from different boroughs to communicate and share best practice.

Recommendation 9. An LGBT Liaison Officer should be deployed at the outset of an investigation into crimes with an impact on the LGBT community. This includes serious incidents, such as the London bombings on 7 July 2005, where there were a large number of LGBT people among the victims.

6.3 Non-police/third-party reporting

The **Ireland serial murder investigations** also highlighted the role of the community as a channel for intelligence gathering, especially when potential victims and witnesses are reluctant to deal with the police. A key witness who saw **Emanuel Spiteri** with Ireland at Charing Cross volunteered the information via Galop.

Today, the police are developing channels for crime reporting through third parties. Galop remains a useful resource with a lot of expertise in this field, but they should not be the only channel for reporting. Reporting mechanisms are also being developed on a national level by other police forces (more details are given in Section 9).

6.4 Community knowledge and advice

In addition to specific witnesses, general advice based on community-specific knowledge played an important role in the investigation of the **Ireland murders**. The police enlisted the help of Galop for some of the cases where the victim was known to be gay. During discussions with Galop, it was noted that previously unlinked victims could have all invited their murderer to their own home for sex. (This hypothesis was confirmed by Ireland's own phone calls to the media.)

An instance where the police would have benefited from community knowledge is the investigation of **Robyn Browne's** death. The information given by the police to the public and the media used different names (of any gender) for Browne. This clearly could have caused confusion among the target audience. From a more general viewpoint, care must be taken with sensitive issues when communicating with the community. In the Browne case, for instance, it was not clear whether the investigation team was fully aware of the different dimensions of transgender identity.

Today, this form of community advice has become formalised through the setting up of independent advisory groups. The use of LGBT independent advisors with community-specific knowledge could be seen in our later cases, the murders of **Windsor** and **Bornkamp**.

In the **Windsor** investigation, we find that improvements could be made in terms of sources of advice. One source was local LGBT Liaison Officers. The police also sought advice from the pan-London LGBT Advisory Group. However, they did not consult several established borough-based community forums. Instead, they appointed their own *ad hoc* liaison person from their own contacts. This led to the alienation and exclusion of key networks at a time when community intelligence was vital.

We want to emphasise that this practice of independent advice is relatively new and its implementation is still evolving. Independent advisory groups have been set up at a pan-London level, advising the investigation teams at a strategic level. Local advisory groups are also being developed at the borough level in order to tap into geographically specific knowledge.

Recommendation 10. Pan-London community advice must be combined with input from local borough forums and networks. Each borough should have an LGBT forum/network with appropriate resources to enable partnership work with the borough police and, in particular, with the LGBT Liaison Officer.

We describe our model of independent advice in Section 12.3.

6.5 Community reassurance

6.5.1 Community safety

In serious incidents, such as a well-publicised murder, the community needs transparency and reassurance that community venues are safe. People may also need

personal safety advice. In the case of **Browne**, a meeting with community representatives did not take place until six weeks after the murder.

Recommendation 11. The police must perform community risk and impact assessments. The community should be informed of the findings as early as possible.

6.5.2 Visible response

A visible police response to a murder can be crucial in establishing community confidence. The **Bornkamp** investigation provided an example of best practice. The appeal for witnesses was given a very high visibility in the local area. This included publishing the appeal on a full-sized billboard in New Cross.

6.6 Community contact coordination

All the above community-related activity for the investigation must be coordinated so that information coming to the team can be processed and analysed together. For instance, it was difficult to judge the community response to the **Browne** investigation during the review of the case files. An LGBT Liaison Officer would have been well placed for this role.

Recommendation 12. It is important that the police have a single point of contact to coordinate information from the community. This contact does not have to be an LGBT Liaison Officer, but should have received training on LGBT issues.

7 Theme: Media relations

7.1 Michael Boothe

Our research found early reports of police witness appeals in the local press (*Ealing & Acton Gazette*) and the LGBT press. The police were frank about a ‘history of mistrust’ between them and the LGBT community. However, as discussed in Section 4.1.4, the negative comments of Supt Shoemake did not help to build community confidence.

There has been significant concern in the LGBT media concerning the investigation of this case. Colin Richardson, then editor of the *Gay Times*, claimed to have enough evidence to have the case reopened. Among the questions he raised was why there had been no collection of forensic evidence from, or house searches of, the suspects.

7.2 Robyn Browne

The MPS report states that all press releases concerning the murder of Robyn Browne were given to the LGBT media. Despite thorough research, no reports of the case were found. This may have been due to a lack of interest in the LGBT press, but clearly a more effective media strategy was needed. We note that a press officer was not appointed to the team until one year after the murder.

We also note that the first press release was not issued to the LGBT community press. We consider this a serious omission, especially after the lessons learnt from the Ireland murders on engaging the LGBT community (see Section 7.6).

Recommendation 13. Particularly in cases where there may be little initial public sympathy for the victim, or where there are sensitive issues of language and culture, we recommend a press officer should be appointed to the Gold Group as early as possible.

See Section 12.3 for the role of the Gold Group.

7.3 Jaap Bornkamp

The murder of Jaap Bornkamp did not spark much media coverage or debate.

The first mention of Bornkamp’s death was a police appeal for witnesses to a murder outside a ‘gay nightclub’ in New Cross. This was accompanied by details of Bornkamp’s age and occupation and his photograph. The numbers for the incident room and Crimestoppers were given (*Pink Paper*, 16 June 2000). The same appeal appeared the following month in the *Gay Times*, this time with the venue being correctly identified as a ‘gay sauna’ (*Gay Times*, July 2000).

According to the MPS Review, press releases were made available to both the general and LGBT press. However, no further reports of the murder were found in either the *Pink Paper* or *Gay Times*. One explanation for this could be that the murder took place the day before the start of the trial of the London nail bomber, David Copeland. Subsequent editions of the gay press were to focus greatly on the trial.

7.4 Geoffrey Windsor

There is a marked contrast between the media coverage of the deaths of Michael Boothe and Geoffrey Windsor, separated as they were by almost a decade. While Michael Boothe's murder provoked anger, marches and much local and gay press coverage, the only mention of Geoffrey Windsor in the LGBT press was one short 'news in brief' paragraph (*Pink Paper*, 5 July 2002). The item stated that a man had been robbed and murdered on a gay cruising ground. There was an appeal for witnesses and contact telephone numbers for the incident room and Crimestoppers. We could find no further mention of this case in the gay press.

A more effective media strategy is needed. In particular, the police should be more persistent in making sure that important information and appeals reach as many LGBT people as possible.

In this case, the media strategy focussed on LGBT media, not necessarily targeting all those who use cruising grounds. As discussed in Section 11.1 on the use of public sex environments, men who seek out sex with other men on cruising grounds do not necessarily identify as LGBT. The police recognised that this group is hard to reach using community news channels. They did contact the LGBT Advisory Group about appropriate websites for appeals. However, we do not know how successful they were in reaching these users of public sex environments.

7.5 David Ridehalgh

MPS press releases did not mention uncertainty over the victim's sexuality, or the possibility that his death was homophobic motivated. For that reason, no press releases were given separately to the LGBT press, and therefore, there was no mention of David Ridehalgh's murder in the LGBT press.

7.6 Ireland murders

7.6.1 Press strategy: involvement of LGBT media

On 10 June 1993, Galop made a connection between the circumstances of two of the murders. On 14 June, the police publicised this link on the Press Bureau Bulletin. This was a regular general bulletin and so did not give a high profile to this key development in the investigation. On Saturday 15 June, the police called a midnight press conference to announce a serial killer was at large. The LGBT media was not invited to this press conference. Given the timing of the press conference, the story did not appear in most national newspapers until Monday 17 June. The *Pink Paper* was told by a 'police chief from the investigation' that the conference had been hastily called as *The Sun* was about to publish a serial killer story with a lot of inaccuracies (*Pink Paper*, 25 June 1993).

Recommendation 14. Mechanisms should be put in place so that the LGBT news media can be informed at the same time as the mainstream and 24-hour media outlets. This should also include LGBT websites.

Emanuel Spiteri died on 12 June 1993, two days after Galop had connected the murders of Collier and Walker, and the same day that Ireland had called Kensington Police Station twice, warning he would kill again and asking "doesn't the death of a homosexual mean anything to you?" (*Gay Times*, February 1994). Questions must be

asked about the delay in alerting the public to the similarities in the two murders. No one can ever know whether, without this delay, Spiteri's terrible fate could have been avoided.

The investigation team learnt from this mistake immediately. The MPS report quotes the Senior Investigating Officer as saying it was a genuine oversight not to invite the LGBT press to this press conference. The involvement of LGBT media improved significantly afterwards. The LGBT press was invited to a subsequent press conference on 21 June and an exclusive briefing on 5 July about CCTV images obtained from Charing Cross.

On 21 June, DCI Ken John invited the LGBT press to a briefing at New Scotland Yard. He was also later gave an interview to the *Pink Paper* (issue of 23 July 1993).

Under mounting pressure from the LGBT community, DCI John announced on 6 July that he had appointed a gay police officer to act as his advisor. This was widely publicised in the LGBT press. This move was welcomed by the LGBT press and led to an increase in calls from potential witnesses. (This officer was also interviewed in the *Pink Paper* on 23 July.)

This was a reaction to the unwillingness of potential witnesses to come forward. To this point police had described the response to their appeals as 'moderate but significant'. DCI John said: "It is my belief that important information is available which will only come from the gay community."(*Pink Paper*, 9 July).

Recommendation 15. The involvement of LGBT Liaison Officers in the investigations of homophobic and transphobic crimes should be publicised at the earliest opportunity to encourage witnesses from the LGBT community to come forward.

During this time, police were keeping an open mind as to a motive for the murders and warned that the whole of the gay community, rather than any one section of it, was at risk. The boyfriend of Andrew Collier gave an interview in which he said Collier was not interested in S&M sex, so anybody could be targeted by the killer (*Pink Paper*, 25 June 1993).

7.6.2 Representation of victims in appeals material

Concern was expressed about the photo used of **Emanuel Spiteri** which showed him in a leather jacket and a leather cap. He was known to dress this way when he visited venues such as the Coleherne, and this choice may have helped potential witnesses from the Coleherne to recognise him. However, this may be inappropriate if the photograph was released in the more mainstream press, unless Spiteri dressed in that way in his daily life.

Recommendation 16. Separate appeal material should be designed if the material is to be distributed through different channels to reach different sets of potential witnesses. It must be recognised that people might know the victim in various social settings.

This agrees with a recommendation from the MPS Review (MPS6 in Appendix C).

8 The murder of George Pugh: Case review process

In the cases reviewed by DI Stephen Dingvean, there had been liaison with the LGBT community. In four of the cases, the news of the murders had significant impact on the community. One case, the murder of David Ridehalgh, was not widely publicised in the LGBT community after police explicitly ruled out a homophobic motive for the attack. It was nevertheless clear that the use of an LGBT Liaison Officer had been considered.

In the planning of this project, we were also keen to examine a murder where there was apparently no LGBT input. The unsolved murder of George Pugh (June 1997) in Kilburn was such a case. This was listed as homophobic by the police. This was a particularly brutal murder and there was a general appeal for information. We have found an item in the local press on the murder but no LGBT connection was made. The LGBT media was not contacted, and as a result, the LGBT community was unaware of it. We are concerned that key elements could be missing from the investigation in terms of intelligence and community risk assessment. We have several questions relating to the investigation:

- How was it determined that there was a homophobic element to the crime?
- Was a community risk assessment performed in relation to the LGBT community in London? If so, what were the findings?
- Was there a strategic decision not to highlight the homophobic element of the crime? If so, why?

The lack of LGBT input in this investigation appears to be an example where police practice and policy do not match. Immense efforts had been made since the Macpherson Report to set up mechanisms for community liaison, such as the Diversity Directorate and independent advisory groups. We are concerned that investigators on the ground are not fully aware of how these new structures can be useful in adding a new perspective to their work.

In consultation with Commander Andre Baker of the Specialist Crime Directorate (February 2004), this case was not selected for the thematic review carried out by DI Stephen Dingvean. The reason given was that the case was in the process of a regular internal review (see Appendix A). We have since learnt that the internal review was completed in April 2003 and authority was given to file away the case in April 2004. However, that review restricted its attention to the possibility of new forensic analysis and *no community element was included in the review* despite the fact that the Advisory Group has highlighted this as a matter of concern. We believe that this omission of a community dimension is a serious failing in the case review process in general.

Recommendation 17. The MPS case review process should include a review of community liaison during the investigation. Independent advice is needed on further liaison work, such as witness appeals and community reassurance, particularly in cases with little or no community liaison at the time of the original investigation.

9 Policy and practice: Non-police/third-party reporting

There is evidence that the rate of reporting of homophobic and transphobic crime is very low compared with the reporting of other crimes. Several factors can be offered as explanations. There has been a history of mistrust of the police by LGBT people, especially older gay men. There remains the perception that homophobic and transphobic crimes are not treated with the same priority or urgency as other hate crimes. This discourages the reporting of crimes, in particular, low-level criminal activity (which nevertheless may add up to a pattern of escalating crime). Also, many crimes associated with LGBT venues are frequently recorded as robberies and assaults without reference to a possible homophobic/transphobic element. This means that it becomes difficult for the local borough police to flag up areas of concern.

Victims and witnesses can be reluctant to contact the police. This is particularly true of crimes at public sex environments. The Ireland murder investigations also provides a good example where witnesses were initially reluctant to come forward so soon after the House of Lords ruling that S&M activity can be prosecuted as causing bodily harm. Information from the public that identified Ireland from a CCTV image at the Charing Cross station came through phone calls to the community organisation, Galop.

Non-police reporting mechanisms have been developed to encourage reporting of crime. This includes the True Vision reporting service developed by several UK police forces for reporting hate crimes. This service provides an online reporting mechanism as well as reporting via post (through reporting forms distributed at community venues). This initiative started in 2005. It is too early to evaluate its impact.

Reporting can also be done via non-police agencies. The information is treated confidentially and the victim/witness can choose to remain anonymous. The value of these anonymous reports is that they enable the police to build up a picture of crimes in the area. Galop offers such a service in London through its helpline Shoutline. The service can obtain reports of crime and pass them on to the police. The London Lesbian and Gay Switchboard is also able to provide this service.

While these services have experience in third-party reporting, we need to develop more channels for reporting crime. For instance, some LGBT groups at the local borough level have done some outreach work in conjunction with the local LGBT Liaison Officer. It was found that many people are more willing to report their experiences when local groups are seen working with the local police. These are of course resource-intensive exercises, and the community members and the LGBT Liaison Officers frequently volunteer their own time to take part in them.

Recommendation 18. We recommend that the role of LGBT Liaison Officers should be supported in all boroughs. Furthermore, one of the key objectives of the liaison role should be the development of local community networks and regular outreach work.

10 Policy and practice: Analysis of LGBT-related crimes

We have recommended that police prevention strategies should include the analysis of homophobic and transphobic crimes on a pan-London level (Recommendation 4). In order to enable effective analysis of crime data, LGBT-related data must be recorded and classified systematically. However, during our review project, we have come across several technical difficulties in extracting such data from MPS databases. The common theme among these difficulties is the lack of a consistent system of recording LGBT-related data.

10.1 Identification of homophobic and transphobic crimes

One of the first tasks in our project was to obtain a list of LGBT-related murders from 1980s to the present day. It soon became clear that the MPS information system (PIB) cannot easily provide a full list of cases, even for murders in the last decade.

- The initial list we received from the MPS contained only a handful of cases. Several well-known cases were omitted.
- No cases involving lesbian victims were found.

Part of this problem stems from the fact that historical cases were not flagged as homophobic or transphobic. (The consistency in the flagging of hate crimes has improved in the last few years since these flags are now incorporated as standard flags in the Crime Report Information System (CRIS).)

However, the historical factor does not explain completely the difficulty in obtaining a comprehensive list of homophobic/transphobic murders. There is constant pressure to improve consistency in how such crimes are recorded in the electronic crime report systems (such as CRIS). It is clear that much work needs to be done.

We are particularly concerned about the lack of cases with lesbian victims. Despite strenuous efforts, we have not been able to identify them from the police database. We know that there are more murders of gay men compared to lesbians. However, we are concerned that hate crimes against lesbians are not being identified properly. More work needs to be done on lesbian-related crimes.

10.2 LGBT-related data in information systems

During a murder investigation, the police have to process a vast amount of intelligence from many sources. An important investigative tool for murder enquiries is HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System). This is an electronic database tool for the management and analysis of large volumes of data in any serious incident. It has been adopted by a number of police forces, including, in the MPS, the Specialist Crime Group, the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate and the Anti-Terrorist Branch.

HOLMES is designed to allow for efficient and effective data searches and cross referencing. Although any information in the system can be searched and extracted in principle, it is necessary to specify a list of searchable fields for fast access to key data. We have found that the HOLMES system does not allow for efficient access to key LGBT-related information that may have a significant impact on investigative

strategies. This includes:

- the sexual orientation and gender identity of victims and suspects
- indications of homophobic or transphobic motives.

Recommendation 19. Key LGBT-related information should be among the list of searchable indices in HOLMES. This should be implemented consistently across different police information systems, such as the Crime Report Information System, CRIS. This information should reflect accurately the sexual orientation, gender identity and family life of LGBT people.

Experience can be borrowed from recent work on the missing person's information database, Merlin.

During the implementation of this recommendation, there may be issues of confidentiality and disclosure that require sensitive handling. However, we do not see these as insurmountable obstacles.

10.3 Risk indicators

In any risk assessment or intelligence analysis, it is not always enough to have a record of LGBT information. The victims of such crimes may be reluctant in revealing their sexual orientation and so some incidents may not be flagged at all. Therefore, it is important to use additional indicators to identify the potential risks of homophobic or transphobic crimes.

There are some non-LGBT-specific factors that are common to many LGBT-related crimes. For instance, all the victims in this review did not know their murderers. This high incidence of stranger attacks is not common among murder cases in general. It makes it particularly difficult for the investigations and partly explains why many of these cases remain unsolved. On the other hand, we can make use of such common factors in analysing crime reports. For instance, a cluster of attacks near Hampstead Heath was identified by analysing crime reports of a similar nature in the area, regardless of whether they were marked as homophobic in CRIS. This led eventually to the successful detection and conviction of the attacker.

Other indicators of risk to LGBT people may be: proximity of an incident to an LGBT venue, incidence of other hate crimes and proximity to a public sex environment.

Recommendation 20. Indicators of risks should be identified for LGBT-related crimes. Such indicators should be implemented as searchable data in information systems such as HOLMES and CRIS. Analysis of this information should be part of any risk assessment exercise in the formulation of prevention strategies.

11 Policy and practice: Policing public sex environments

Several of the murders in this study involved public sex environments (PSEs). These are public places where people can meet each other for sex. Some people have sex there. Others meet there for potential partners but engage in sexual activity elsewhere.

11.1 The use of public sex environments

The use of PSEs has evolved over the years. Although the use of PSEs by men in search of sex with men has caught media attention, heterosexual people also use PSEs (sometimes known as ‘dogging’). In this review of LGBT murders, we will focus on the role of PSEs in relation to men who have sex with men. It should be noted that many of these men do not self-identify as gay. The anonymity and casual nature of these environments allow for a whole range of sexual identities that is difficult to classify.

There are some open spaces, such as public parks, which are well known to be used as ‘cruising grounds’ by gay men. Some public toilets are also known as places where men can meet for casual sex (‘cottaging’). Much of this activity occurs at night when the general public is unlikely to visit these places. Although this reduces the chance of discovery, it also makes the men who make use of these places vulnerable to opportunistic crime and homophobic attacks.

11.2 Legislative background

Legislation concerning PSEs and the policing of PSEs has changed in recent years. Throughout the period covered by this report, gay sex in public places was illegal. The use of PSEs by men who have sex with men could be prosecuted as gross indecency. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 reformed the legislation. A core principle behind the legal reform is that the law and its enforcement should be gender-neutral and should not discriminate against LGBT people. The key change concerning PSEs is that sexual activity can only be criminalised if a person knows or ought to know that they are likely to cause distress or offence. The only exception to this rule is that all sexual activity in public toilets is illegal, irrespective of the likelihood of discovery by a third party.

11.3 Historical practice

For many years, the policing of PSEs focussed on the prosecution of public sexual activity. Historically, this meant police raids and arrests. Although such operations had concrete outcomes in terms of performance statistics, they are not necessarily effective in the long term: the result was often to displace the activity to other cruising grounds. However, this policy gave rise to distrust of the police by the users of these PSEs who felt the police response was disproportionate for sexual activity that was hidden and consensual. The police policy was also regarded as discriminatory because a more lenient attitude was taken towards public heterosexual activity.

The murder of Michael Boothe (1990) illustrates how such a policing policy had a direct impact on a murder investigation. Michael Boothe was attacked near a public toilet known for cottaging activity. The police knew about this, and had tried to clear the area of such activity. After the murder, the police investigation was hampered by the lack of intelligence from witnesses. Despite the fact that they had identified a gang of local youths as suspects, they were unable to gather enough evidence to charge them. The death of Michael Boothe attracted a lot of attention from the LGBT media. The failure

of the investigation further antagonised the LGBT community. Many felt that the police had failed in their duty to protect the public before the murder and that they had failed to mount an effective investigation afterwards.

MPS practice in this area has improved since 1990. Different boroughs of the MPS area have developed new practices. The police now recognise that the policing of PSEs must be fair, proportionate and non-discriminatory.

11.4 Policing PSEs: a prevention focus

The police now recognise that the users of PSEs can be victims of crime and their safety should be part of policing policy for the PSE. The policy should be developed working in consultation with the local LGBT community. This could include outreach work to educate the users of PSEs on issues of personal safety and to alert them of violent crimes in the area. This could be done in collaboration with local LGBT networks. The local police should assess the risk of crime and also consider measures to deter opportunistic crime, such as the improvement of street lighting.

It is clear that personal safety is an important factor and the use of dangerous cruising grounds should be dissuaded. However, these murders were not ‘destined’ to take place. In the cases of Boothe and Windsor, we believe that the local police units should have been more proactive in their response to the increased incidence of violent attacks in the area in the weeks before the murder (see Section 4.5.1).

Recommendation 21. We recommend that the MPS should systematically disseminate information about crimes at PSEs. The MPS should consult on the most effective way to reach the wide range of PSE users to promote personal safety and to alert them of any increased incidence of crimes at PSEs.

Sexual health organisations which engage in outreach work on PSEs might have expertise in this area. However, the use of PSEs is constantly evolving. For instance, the internet has become a channel for information sharing among PSE users.

11.5 Pan-London coordination

In Section 4.5.1 on the murder of Geoffrey Windsor at Beaulieu Heights, we have already discussed the need for cross-borough coordination of intelligence on homophobic and transphobic crimes. We repeat here our **Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the MPS should have a coordinated pan-London mechanism to share and analyse intelligence proactively to identify clustering of homophobic and transphobic crimes. Perpetrators of these crimes can migrate from one area to another. It is therefore important that any intelligence model is not restricted by geographical boundaries.

11.6 Sharing best practice

The importance of learning these lessons is highlighted by the murder of Jody Dubrowski on Clapham Common in 2005. His killers were also responsible for more than one violent attack in the area before the murder. As in the Windsor and Boothe cases, there was a lack of proactive response from the police in terms of prevention measures such as alerting the public of violent attacks at the PSE.

Recommendation 22. We recommend that the police should put in place mechanisms to identify best practice, to incorporate them into MPS policy, and to ensure that MPS practice in the local boroughs follows these policies.

12 Policy and practice: Managing critical incidents

The MPS defines a critical incident as:

'any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community.'

The following questions may help to put this definition in context.

12.1 Victim and family

Has the victim, the victim's family (or someone from the wider community) expressed **concerns about the investigation** which reflect a general perception in the community that the police are not effective or not sensitive in dealing with incidents of this kind?

'Family' (or 'next of kin') does not have to be biologically related to the victim. For some LGBT people, the 'family' may be a support network of friends.

12.2 Community impact

The term 'community' can refer to a geographical locality, a demographic trait (*e.g.* age), a London-wide (or even regional/national) community linked by race, ethnicity, faith, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity.

This includes the communities of the victims, witnesses or suspects, or the wider community.

12.2.1 Background

Has there been a **history** of police-community relationship which contributed to a lack of confidence in the police?

Have **recent incidents** led the community to question whether the police service is sensitive to the needs and concerns of the community?

Has there been **recent media coverage** which challenges the effectiveness of the service provided by the police to this community?

12.2.2 Current incident

Have there been **recent trends or clusters** of incidents of a similar nature which have a significant *cumulative* impact on the local community? This includes an increase in crimes with the same pattern or repeat victimisations.

Has there been or will there be **significant media interest** in the current incident?

Would the management of this investigation benefit from **independent advice** (see Section 12.3 below)?

12.2.3 Opportunities

Would a high-profile response improve **community liaison** for the current investigation and for the future (*e.g.* access to community intelligence, strengthening relationships with community groups)? Note that effective liaison includes feedback and debriefing to community advisors.

Would a high-profile response improve **community confidence for the future**? For instance, this can lead to improved reporting rates from the community.

Does this incident provide **important lessons** for the management of future incidents?

12.3 Independent advice

The LGBT Advisory Group has built up expertise in offering independent advice to critical incident Gold Groups. A Gold Group includes the senior investigating officer in charge of operational and tactical issues of the investigation. It will also include a member from the senior management of the Specialist Crime Directorate who will oversee wider strategic issues around the case. The Gold Group will also have officers to advise on different aspects of the investigation, such as family liaison officers, LGBT Liaison Officers and press officers. In the case of hate crimes, independent advisors will be invited to give advice from a community perspective.

The LGBT Advisory Group has developed a model of independent advice over the years. We will deploy an independent advisor from the Advisory Group to join the Gold Group. The main role of this advisor is to advise the police on strategic issues. We will also be able to put the Gold Group in touch with local advisors at the borough level. We are developing this network of local advisors mainly through LGBT forums in the 32 London boroughs and Heathrow. In parallel, we are developing a training model for these local advisors to ensure that they understand the implications of their advisory role.

13 Policy and practice: Language and terminology

The police have to engage with people from different cultures and communities. It is important that they are sensitive about the language used when they communicate with them. Trust by potential witnesses and community confidence can be easily undermined. One should also be careful not to make assumptions according to stereotypes. We use examples from the MPS review to illustrate some specific LGBT issues.

13.1 Identity

The report claimed that certain factors ‘identified Windsor as being part of the gay community’. While Geoffrey Windsor was a man who had sex with other men, it does not necessarily mean that he was part of a gay community. Many men who have sex with men do not identify themselves as gay. This is particularly true among users of public sex environments. It is important to remember this so that the appropriate people are targeted in any strategy to gather intelligence or to disseminate information.

13.2 Assumptions and stereotypes

In the description of Geoffrey Windsor, the MPS review commented that, ‘due to his lifestyle, he had no long-term partner.’ Although it is easy to make a link between these two factors, it is not always correct to make such an assumption. Some LGBT people have stable long-term relationships which are not monogamous. This highlights the fact that some LGBT people can have unconventional social arrangements in certain aspects of their lives.

On the investigations of the murders by Ireland, the descriptions of the life of the victims appear to make assumptions about the wider lives of the victims from just one aspect of their lives. Walker was described as a ‘promiscuous gay man who engaged in S&M’, Dunn was described as ‘promiscuous, insecure and lonely’, and Bradley was described as a ‘secretive gay male’.

While we understand that investigators have to employ conjectures and hypotheses in the investigative process, care must be taken not to reinforce negative stereotypes in communicating information to the public and the media. As we can see from the press coverage of the time (Appendix D), the media was only too ready to make sensationalised conclusions about the lifestyles of LGBT people. This could result in a hostile public reaction that seriously undermines witness appeal campaigns.

The information disseminated about LGBT victims often has an emphasis on sexual preferences. It is easy to forget that the LGBT community is diverse in itself in terms of race, age, faith, disability, profession and many other social factors. LGBT people are integrated into all aspects of society. For instance, it is important to remember this when planning victim support for large-scale incidents, such as after the London bombings on 7 July 2005 or after the tsunami in South East Asia in 2004.

13.3 Terminology

Pubs and other venues where gay men socialise and meet were described as being ‘frequented by’ gay men. Historically, this term has negative connotations of underground illicit activity for the LGBT community and should be avoided. Examples of more neutral descriptions would be: ‘the victim was a regular customer’ at a certain

pub, or a specific bar 'is popular among LGBT people' or 'has a predominantly lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender clientele'.

There are also several references to the 'gay community' which omits mention of lesbian, bisexual and transgender people. This can be a sensitive issue for some people. Using the term 'LGBT' will also be an explicit reminder that there are diverse needs among LGBT people.

Appendix A. Police review process

A murder investigation is subject to a continuous review process by various levels of command within the police service.

At 24 hours after the crime, an initial snapshot review is performed by a Detective Superintendent in the investigation team to check that the major lines of enquiry are identified, that correct procedures are followed and that the investigation is suitably resourced. Further reviews occur at 7 days and 21 days as the enquiry develops.

A Murder Review Group is set up after four weeks to perform a full review of the investigation up to an agreed 'cut off' point. This is called **Progress Review**. In addition to reviewing the lines of enquiry, this group also makes recommendations to senior management for resourcing and future direction of the enquiry.

There is also the possibility at any time to undertake a thematic review on any part or parts of the enquiry which the Senior Investigating Officer has deemed appropriate.

The findings of this Review Group are examined by a **DAC Review Panel** chaired by a Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Specialist Crime Directorate. This ensures that any changes to procedures or practice can be captured in a structured fashion and included in revision of relevant manuals.

Unsolved homicides eventually reach a **Case Closure Panel**. This is chaired by the Commander of Homicide and Specialist Crime. Independent advisors can be invited as appropriate. The panel can agree to the closure of an enquiry based on application by the senior investigating officer that the lines of enquiry identified have been exhausted.

The panel may, however, order further enquiries.

This does not prevent an enquiry from being re-opened if new information comes to light.

In any event, where appropriate, the enquiry will be reviewed every three years for consideration of new forensic opportunity due to developments in technology, such as DNA analysis. In all instances of case closure, the views of the victim's family should be taken into account.

If the crime is considered critical in terms of community impact, a **Gold Group** (see Section 12.3) is also set up in parallel to the above review structure. Such a group has community input through independent advisors. The advisors can be involved at a strategic pan-London level and at a local borough level.

Appendix B. Summary of report recommendations

Recommendation 1. We recommend that clear protocols must be developed for the public disclosure of HIV status, assessing the relevance of such disclosure to the investigation.

Recommendation 2. In cases involving transgender people, advice should be sought from transgender community groups. Legal advice should also be taken regarding disclosure of transgender status. Training should be provided, in particular regarding recent legal reforms (Gender Recognition Act 2004).

Recommendation 3. Diversity training to the police needs to address cultural diversity among LGBT people.

Recommendation 4. We recommend that the MPS should have a coordinated pan-London mechanism to share and analyse intelligence proactively to identify clustering of homophobic and transphobic crimes. Perpetrators of these crimes can move from one area to another. It is therefore important that any intelligence model is not restricted by geographical boundaries.

Recommendation 5. A separate family log should be maintained and a separate FLO should be assigned to a victim's 'family by choice' which may include a partner and close friends.

Recommendation 6. Clear guidance should be given to FLOs and to investigators where the victim's sexuality/gender identity is not known to the blood family. In particular, three scenarios should receive close attention:

- where his/her sexuality or gender identity is known to people close to the victim or his/her social network but not shared with blood family;
- where the victim's sexuality/gender identity, though relevant, is not clearly known to anyone in his/her close circle;
- where the victim's known name differs between different family/social networks.

Recommendation 7. The local police must have a proactive policy of continuing engagement with the community in order to build trust and confidence in the police.

Recommendation 8. We recommend that there should be at least one LGBT Liaison Officer working effectively in each of the Metropolitan police boroughs. LGBT Liaison Officers should be supported and appropriately resourced. Training should include opportunities for liaison officers from different boroughs to communicate and share best practice.

Recommendation 9. An LGBT Liaison Officer should be deployed at the outset of an investigation into crimes with an impact on the LGBT community. This includes serious incidents, such as the London bombings on 7 July 2005, where there were a large number of LGBT people among the victims.

Recommendation 10. Pan-London community advice must be combined with input from local borough forums and networks. Each borough should have an LGBT forum/network with appropriate resources to enable partnership work with the borough police and, in particular, with the LGBT Liaison Officer.

Recommendation 11. The police must perform community risk and impact assessments. The community should be informed of the findings as early as possible.

Recommendation 12. It is important that the police have a single point of contact to coordinate information from the community. This contact does not have to be an LGBT Liaison Officer, but should have received training on LGBT issues.

Recommendation 13. Particularly in cases where there may be little initial public sympathy for the victim, or where there are sensitive issues of language and culture, we recommend a press officer should be appointed to the Gold Group as early as possible.

Recommendation 14. Mechanisms should be put in place so that the LGBT news media can be informed at the same time as the mainstream and 24-hour media outlets. This should also include LGBT websites.

Recommendation 15. The involvement of LGBT Liaison Officers in the investigations of homophobic and transphobic crimes should be publicised at the earliest opportunity to encourage witnesses from the LGBT community to come forward.

Recommendation 16. Separate appeal material should be designed if the material is to be distributed through different channels to reach different sets of potential witnesses. It must be recognised that people might know the victim in various social settings.

Recommendation 17. The MPS case review process should include a review of community liaison during the investigation. Independent advice is needed on further liaison work, such as witness appeals and community reassurance, particularly in cases with little or no community liaison at the time of the original investigation.

Recommendation 18. We recommend that the role of LGBT Liaison Officers should be supported in all boroughs. Furthermore, one of the key objectives of the liaison role should be the development of local community networks and regular outreach work.

Recommendation 19. Key LGBT-related information should be among the list of searchable indices in HOLMES. This should be implemented consistently across different police information systems, such as the Crime Report Information System, CRIS. This information should reflect the sexual orientation, gender identity and family life of LGBT people accurately.

Recommendation 20. Indicators of risks should be identified for LGBT-related crimes. Such indicators should be implemented as searchable data in information systems such as HOLMES and CRIS. Analysis of this information should be part of any risk assessment exercise in the formulation of prevention strategies.

Recommendation 21. We recommend that the MPS should systematically disseminate information about crimes at PSEs. The MPS should consult on the most effective way to reach the wide range of PSE users to promote personal safety and to alert them of any increased incidence of crimes at PSEs.

Recommendation 22. We recommend that the police should put in place mechanisms to identify best practice, to incorporate them into MPS policy, and to ensure that MPS practice in the local boroughs follows these policies.

Appendix C. MPS Review Team recommendations

The MPS Review Team have made a series of recommendation in their review of the murder investigations. We list them here and make some brief comments. In the following, DCC4 refers to the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate.

MPS1. It is recommended that further research be undertaken to see if the service level recommendation (to involve independent advice in the Gold Strategy Group) was progressed to a conclusion and if not that consideration be given to reactivating the recommendation.

This has been implemented. See Section 12.

MPS2. It is recommended that if there is a conflict between the families towards the surviving partners, that a separate family log is kept for contact with that person, and if applicable and available, a separate Family Liaison Officer is appointed.

See our Recommendation 5.

MPS3. It is recommended that a DCC4 liaison officer is appointed at the outset of every homophobic murder as a single point of contact and actioned through the Senior Investigating Officer's decision log and HOLMES to enable the actions and results to be collated within the enquiry.

We agree with this in principle, but the restructuring of DCC4 may mean that the role lies with Territorial Policing and there might be insufficient resources within DCC4 to fulfill the role envisioned in this recommendation.

MPS4. It is recommended that when the police liaise with the community groups, that the decision log is specific with regard to what is required from the community *i.e.* not just 'community leaders have been contacted'.

We agree. The decision log needs a clear strategic view on community intelligence and independent advice, *e.g.* how to gather intelligence, what information is needed.

MPS5. It is recommended that when liaison is made with a *bona fide* LGBT representative that a contact number is supplied to the community at the earliest opportunity.

We suggest that community organisations rather than individuals are, in general, better equipped to be a channel between the police and communities (see Section 9 on non-police/third-party reporting). Identifying contacts and devising a strategy for publicity would benefit from independent advice. Care must be taken regarding disclosure of personal information: this requires consent from the contact.

MPS6. It is recommended that when a photograph is released care should be taken in identifying the correct photograph to supply to a target group. Only material that will attract a required response should be released.

We have extended this recommendation. See our Recommendation 16.

MPS7. It is recommended that the media strategy should not just include the 24-hour media but also local and community related media in order to reach the maximum potential audience. In doing so the service is shown as both open and transparent.

We agree. A coherent media strategy must go beyond the print media, *e.g.* include websites and internet chat sites. See also our Recommendation 14.

MPS8. It is recommended that the LGBT and other interested stakeholders be informed of the general working of SCD murder investigation and murder review by way of presentation.

We agree.

MPS9. It is recommended that DCC4 produce a corporate training package and deliver the same to the borough liaison officers.

Training days have been run for LGBT Liaison Officers. This has to be integrated into an ongoing programme of professional development. It is also important to provide diversity awareness training for officers in general. Where training on LGBT issues has been carried out consistently, *e.g.* with Family Liaison Officers, the benefits have been clearly demonstrable. This requires serious resources and continued support.

MPS10. It is recommended that the business case drafted by DCC4 (Carl Wonfor) be adhered to; in that dedicated liaison officers are allowed sufficient time to perform their role.

The LGBT Advisory Group has always supported the development of the role of LGBT Liaison Officers. See our Recommendation 8. This should also be viewed in conjunction with our Recommendation 10.

MPS11. It is recommended that DCC4 liaise with Galop to promulgate wider recognition of the opportunity to report crime and intelligence. In particular those who do not consider themselves part of the mainstream gay community.

We agree. This should take account of different ways of reaching lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people. We must develop other channels for reporting. See Section 9.

MPS12. It is recommended that DCC4 collate all the relevant gay community agencies and their methods of crime/intelligence reporting to ensure that a complete overview of intelligence is obtained on a regular basis, thereby enabling BOCU's (Borough Operational Command Units) to formulate an early strategy of prevention of crime.

We agree, but this must be appropriately resourced.

MPS13. It is further recommended that when presenting future publications and briefings involving members of the gay community, that members of the community are made fully aware of the importance of not just reporting crimes but also of providing intelligence.

We agree, but care must be taken to recognise the diversity among LGBT people.

MPS14. It is recommended that DCC4 identify through SCD10 and Special Branch (SO12) CHIS both within the gay community and within groups who are known to express homophobic views.

CHIS stands for Covert Human Intelligence Sources, namely witnesses and informants. We want to emphasise here the need to have strict protocols to protect witness confidentiality. In terms of informants, historical infiltration of the LGBT community for the purposes of entrapment makes this a very sensitive area indeed, and there is potential for a serious setback in relations with the police.

MPS15. It is recommended that the DCC4 recommendation regarding the scoping of unreported homophobic incidents be re-presented for further consideration in the light of this review and the work of the Homophobic Gold Group in general.

We agree. This was supported by the LGBT Advisory Group.

Appendix D. Press coverage

The following is a selection of contemporary press reports on the Ireland murders.

National press requests for information to the Pink Paper

Interview with one of the victim's lovers (*Daily Express*)

How gay men identify sexual interest (*The Sun*)

What SM sex involves (*Newsweek*)

What is difference between 'rough sex' and SM sex (*Daily Telegraph*)

Conjecture, misinformation and stereotyping

'Fear in a twilight world' - 'Predatory, risky and anonymous world of multiple sex partners and hasty sex with strangers', '...often unwilling to heed the safe sex message. For them the risk is part of the thrill.' (*Evening Standard*)

'3 out of 5 of the victims were HIV+. Was it a revenge attack by someone revisiting partners who may have passed on the disease?' By crime correspondent Terry Kirby. (*The Independent*)

'Police fear gay strangler is using FBI manual.' (*Daily Mail*)

'Is gay serial killer a cop?' (*Daily Star*)

'Sado Sam' (*Daily Star*)

'...a biker's bar called the Coal Urn' (*Daily Mirror*)

'Hannibal Hunt for Serial Killer' - with picture of Anthony Hopkins wearing Hannibal Lector mask (*Daily Mirror*)

'Gay's Hanky Panky Code - ...a handkerchief in the right pocket means "I am a dominant gay" and in the left means "I am submissive".' (*The Sun*)

Media commentator Terry Sanderson also reported on homophobic language used by national newspapers during the case, including 'sleazy', 'sordid' and 'disgusting'. He suggested the newspapers had painted a picture of a 'London scene populated entirely by deeply unhappy men cruising dingy bars for dangerous and perverted sex.' (*Gay Times*, July 1993)

The News of the World reported that police were working undercover in London's gay scene. The MPS report makes clear that this was untrue and furthermore 'could have caused the investigating team some problems and mistrust within the gay community.'

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the invaluable input of Simon Forbes to this project. Simon chaired the project from the start and was heavily involved in the analysis of the MPS review before he left the LGBT Advisory Group to devote his time to other work.

We would also like to thank Colin Richardson for his advice at the start of this project and Vicky Powell (*Gay Times*) who gave us access to the cuttings archives at Gay Times.

We are grateful to DI Stephen Dingvean and his team for undertaking the thematic review of our selected cases. We also thank Commander Andre Baker for providing the resources for that review.

The LGBT Advisory Group is a group of independent advisors to the Metropolitan Police. We are a voluntary group working for better policing for LGBT people in London. We are grateful to the team for the LGBT strand at the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate, in particular PC Carl Wonfor, who provided liaison with the Specialist Crime Directorate and facilitated the writing and the publishing of this report.

If you have any information regarding any of the cases mentioned in this report, you can provide this, anonymously if necessary, through any of the following:

<i>Galop</i>	www.galop.org.uk	020 7704 2040
<i>True Vision</i>	www.report-it.org.uk	Online reporting facility
<i>Crimestoppers</i>	www.crimestoppers-uk.org	0800 555 111